

# Qualitative Methods in the Psychological Diagnosis

Henryk Jarosiewicz  
*Department of Psychology,  
University of Wrocław, Poland*

## Introduction

It has been 15 years since T. Tyszka published a collection of articles entitled “Return to the introspection? Collecting and analyzing verbal reports”.<sup>41</sup> The editor dedicated the volume “In memory of Prof. Mieczysław Kreutz, an outstanding defender of introspection in psychology”. It was the year when Prof. Marian Kulczycki, who was not so much a defender as a great practitioner of the introspective method, died (1924–1995). I would like to dedicate this paper to Prof. Kulczycki.

Certainly, we cannot talk about a “return” to the introspective method as the method is [...] widely used, for example, in questionnaires. If there are any problems, they concern the concept of man which underlies those methods. We cannot understand introspection not understanding the subject itself. A research method, whether introspective or some other, must correspond to its subject. So, how should we understand man as the subject of psychology?

This paper aims at presenting a model of man and explaining man’s activity in the subjective aspect (inner experience) and objective aspect (outer experience). Based on the above, we will define qualitative methods and attempt to systematize them.

## Details

### Relativity of the concept of the subject and the object of cognition

The method of cognition and way of acting are determined by the object being acquainted with and acted upon. Why? It does not stem from convention but the fact that the notion of the “object” indicates “something” (being) acquainted with or acted upon by another being defined as the “subject”. **The subject** understood as the source of its existence and actions, including cognitive ones, searches for a method

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<sup>41</sup> Tyszka, *Czy powrót do retrospekcji? Zbieranie i analiza danych słownych*, 1995.

of cognition (acting) as **the object** is by nature something that puts up resistance – is an object (*obiectum*)<sup>42</sup>. On the other hand, the method depends on actions taken by the subject as the subject takes cognitive actions in relation to some other being. The acting subject selects the method. As we will see later on, the choice of one method may result in putting aside other ways of acting. However, paradoxically, one of beings acquainted with does not put up resistance in the process of cognition and acting: it is the subject itself, which is given as an object. The subject is given itself as an object in direct cognitive contact we call **introspection**. So just like mathematics is the queen of formal sciences, introspection is the queen among human sciences. The problem is the use of the abundance of inner information. We assume that outer experience only completes inner experience; the man first feels himself/herself and only later observes, first experiences his/her conditions and emotions related with it and only later realizes their meaning and cause.

In this paper we will start with the notion of the subject of psychology that perceives man as both a thing among other things and a subject among other subjects. Next we will show how we can gain theoretical insight into the inner world of the subject, in the world that is imposed on the subject and which constitutes a cognitive obstacle due to the excess and specific nature of data, not their lack. These are phenomena that “happen” inside man. Happening is a reality that usually precedes actions, as we will explain later on – even makes the action meaningful.

The tool that allows us to gain an insight into and understand man is a model of man<sup>43</sup>. Just like medicine offers anatomical knowledge, psychology, becoming a more mature science, offers a model of its subject, *i.e.* the concept of the subject itself. The core of this paper is a catalogue of objective activities, *i.e.* a list of different actualizations of the subject. In order to act in so many different ways, the subject must exist in a number of ways of different quality. Qualitative methods are methods of getting to know those different actions taken by the subject. In the last part of this paper we will refer to works by M. Kulczycki as an example of subtle orientation in the area of personal problems. We will also propose a division of qualitative methods.

## Subject of psychology

The Lvov-Warsaw School of Logic (Rzepa, 1997) assumed as the subject of psychology the mental life and dispositions, *i.e.* conditions that determine mental life. According to K. Twardowski, the founder of the school, this peculiar “life” is accessible from within, as facts of consciousness given in introspection:

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<sup>42</sup> Lenartowicz perceives the “object” as something that puts up resistance: “Consciousness gets to know an object in such a way that does not restrict, transform or modify it in any way. Besides, consciousness cannot do it. The object in Latin is called “obiectum” – that is something that “oblicitur”, that opposes, resists, does not give in to consciousness, which makes consciousness helpless, and this way it can only get to know the object but cannot change it.” (Lenartowicz, 1979, p. 36).

<sup>43</sup> J. Rost writes that “the notion of the model stresses the integrity of material being the subject of the research and the research method; (...) Each method is nothing but application of a model” (Rost, 2008).

The subject of psychology is facts of consciousness, states of consciousness, etc. while by “facts of consciousness” we understand facts given in **introspection**, *i.e.* mental facts.<sup>44</sup>

As regards dispositions, they are accessible in a different way, as phenomena that explain facts:


Dispositions are never recognized in experience directly; they are always only something **hypothetical**, and when juxtaposed with facts in psychology they have a role similar to energy in physics or the atom in chemistry, *i.e.* the role of hypothetical factors assumed in order to link and **explain** facts.<sup>45</sup>

M. Kreutz, a follower of Twardowski, writes:

The subject of psychology is **mental phenomena** (...) and also conditions in which mental phenomena occur and develop, *i.e.* first the so-called *mental dispositions* (*i.e.* characteristics of living beings, in particular man, that determine mental phenomena) and **physical phenomena**, in which some psychical phenomena manifest themselves, as the so-called *physical symptoms*, and those that depend on the psyche – like, above all, *movements* and *free actions*. The physical phenomena mentioned can be collectively called “behavior” of an individual.<sup>46</sup>

So we deal here with two different aspect of defining the subject: as a physical phenomenon (behavior) and mental phenomena.

Figure 1: Subject of psychology



<sup>44</sup> Twardowski, 1965 h, p. 245.

<sup>45</sup> Twardowski, 1965 h, p. 245

<sup>46</sup> Kreutz, *Podstawy psychologii. Studium nad metodami i pojęciami współczesnej psychologii*, 1949, p. 16.

We can present those aspects in a complementary way or juxtapose them, and as a result one may exclude the other. Twardowski solved this problem of tension in his concept of actions and products (Twardowski, 1965 g). The title reflects the main idea: material behavior is the product of mental actions. What we encounter here is not so much a juxtaposition of those two objects of psychology as complement.

Twardowski's concept leads to a number of conclusions. First of all, it is a tool to explain man's behavior: outer experience is explained by inner experience the object of which is mental actions and products. In other words, mental actions and products constitute the meaning of the behavior observed.

## Systematic insight into the world of mental phenomena

### *Two methods of explaining: demonstrandum and explanandum*

There are two ways of explaining behavior defined by another follower of Twardowski, K. Ajdukiewicz, a logician (Ajdukiewicz, 1965). As he writes:

Among problems solved in life and science we can name ones in the case of which we ask what is the situation like, and other, in the case of which, once we know the situation, we ask why it is so. Answering the first question, we describe the reality. Answering the second question, we explain a piece of reality discovered.<sup>47</sup>

As he points out later on, there is a close relationship between explaining and demonstrating:

When we prove a statement and when we explain a situation, we answer the same question: "why?" Hence we can expect that the process of explaining will be similar to the process of demonstrating but in the case of explaining what is to be explained will be already known and will not have to be double-checked while in the case of demonstrating what is to be demonstrated will be unknown and the proof will be to assure us about that.<sup>48</sup>

We should have in mind the fact that the very starting point of the research procedure, *i.e.* the description, may be made in two different ways: we describe in one way when we demonstrate and in some other when we explain. In the first case (demonstrating) we describe in a clear way while in the other – in a confident way. Why? A research procedure in which we start with a theoretical concept chosen and – by the process of deduction – we predict consequences that arise from the assumptions is clear. If we can demonstrate those consequences, for example, by manipulating groups, then our deductions point to new actions that can be taken. On the other hand, we can start with facts we already know (established). It is typical for the so-called real sciences. For example: someone is an efficient and self-satisfied employee. Those facts require

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<sup>47</sup> Ajdukiewicz, 1965, p. 395

<sup>48</sup> See above, p. 397.

justification and not demonstration. They are certain as they already exist; however, the reasons behind them are not always clear. We explain them by asking: why is that person so efficient (what makes that person so efficient)?

What differs the two procedures is the way of illuminating (perceiving) the reality: demonstration sentences are clear (as sentences being the product of deduction) but... their actual existence is not certain. We are only looking for conditions (the so-called sufficient conditions) that will make the results occur. The process of demonstrating (indicating a given probability) makes hypotheses certain, thanks to the power of certainty of the theoretical assumptions made. By way of demonstrating we illuminate the future practice, this way making it possible.

In the process of explaining, the flow of certainty goes in the opposite direction. We demonstrate *ex post facto*. We demonstrate something that happened in the past. We do not have to demonstrate anything, and if we do – it concerns arguments in favor of existing facts. Here we point to the so-called preconditions. A good example is the following sentence: “I do not know a man who has attained success in life and does not have character.” Ajdukiewicz presents it in the following way:

A sentence to be demonstrated is called demonstrandum. By analogy, a sentence presenting a state of affairs to be explained is called explanandum.

Demonstrandum is always a sentence which is not taken to be true in advance but one we treat as a true once we derive it in the demonstration process from other sentences taken to be true in advance.

Explanandum (...) is always a sentence treated as true in advance, *i.e.* one we do not take to be true in the process of explaining by deriving it from other sentences treated as true in advance but which we treat as true before we derive it in the process of explaining from other sentences treated as true.<sup>49</sup>

Where do we derive such sentences (opinions) taken to be correct from? – From experience.<sup>50</sup> And by experience we mean both life experience and clinical experience, experience derived from working as a counselor, and also recorded other people’s experience.

### *A method of looking inside the subject*

As a result of assuming the concept of actions and products, we (theoretically) look inside the subject. In this case action differs from behavior. Nonetheless, we should stress that a mental action is accessible empirically. In the Twardowski’s school empirical data are not limited to experimental data. The empirical method reaches deep inside material behavior, reaches mental (inner) actions and products.

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<sup>49</sup> See above, 397, underlined by me.

<sup>50</sup> “Inductive sciences (...) base their assumptions mainly on sentences directly founded on experience, in sentences that provide these sciences with the so-called empirical basis.” Ajdukiewicz, 1965, p. 220).

The **specific character** of facts being the subject of psychology makes the empirical method gain in psychology some individual features that concern both **sources** used in psychology to learn about mental facts as well as means used in psychology to examine the facts.<sup>51</sup>

And due to the specific character of the sources:

The only source<sup>52</sup> from which we learn directly about some mental facts is the so-called **introspection, inner experience, consciousness**. All those words mean **a method of getting to know** that differs from getting to know the sensual, physical and material world.<sup>53</sup>

Thanks to this method of cognition the subject is given in a subjective way, that is from within. Consciousness is not a new being but a new way of being's existence. And as such a way is available (as a fact we depart from), we do not need arguments to use it but reasons to exclude it.

Twardowski was conscious of the specific character of this source of empirical knowledge; he pointed to two differences in relation to outer experience:

The first one lies in the notion of non-sensuality of inner experience; it means that we do not need senses to directly learn mental facts as sense organs do not participate in the process.

(...) The second difference is the fact that introspection is limited to the mental life of one person who performs it.<sup>54</sup>

This is the starting point for his thesis concerning the specific nature of the psychological method and psychology as a science. However, this specific character does not downgrade scientificity. Even though the source of information is subjective (and given only to one subject), the science itself is objective: it is "subjective objectivity" (as for its genesis).<sup>55</sup>

The specific character of the psychological method is constantly in danger due to attempts to treat psychology as a science that relies on external observations exclusively. However, it would be "subjective objectivity" (Jarosiewicz, 2010), *i.e.* single-aspect, detached from man's overall experience.<sup>56</sup>

We need to differentiate justified subjectivity from subjectivism. Twardowski refuted the accusation of subjectivism by connecting an action with an observable product. He writes:

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<sup>51</sup> Twardowski, , 1965 h, p. 256

<sup>52</sup> In this case it concerns not so much the source as origin (genesis) as a way of obtaining information.

<sup>53</sup> See above, p. 257.

<sup>54</sup> Twardowski, *O psychologii, jej przedmiocie, zadaniach, metodzie, stosunku do innych nauk i jej rozwoju*, 1965 h

<sup>55</sup> While as a product of objectivization of what is subjective we obtain "objective subjectivity", that is objective knowledge as the subject becomes the object of the observation.

<sup>56</sup> M. Kreutz listed objections to the introspective method and rejected them in a very convincing way (Kreutz, 1962). See also: (Stachowski, *Historia współczesnej myśli psychologicznej. Od Wundta do czasów najnowszych*, 2004, p. 71 and subsequent).

The need to expand the scope of psychological research to the mental life of other beings, which we cannot learn from introspection, makes a psychologist acknowledge sources from which they can at least indirectly learn facts concerning someone else's mental life.<sup>57</sup>

Indirect access to phenomena examined is nothing special in science. Also in physics, for example, we do not have direct access to elementary particles, only following tracks they leave in recorders. The so-called "elementary particle" is a justified postulate. As a result we get access to new sources of information about inner actions:

The sources are all facts, things, mental objects, in which mental facts somehow manifest themselves, so all psychophysical actions and products, *i.e.* physical actions accompanied by mental activities impacting in some way the former ones and such physical products that are created as a result of the psychophysical activities already defined<sup>58</sup>.

The world of "manifestations" of the mental life is vast:

All impermanent outer manifestations of mental actions and products, that is all psychophysical actions and all impermanent psychophysical products, can be called **signs** of mental life while all **permanent** manifestations of mental products, so all permanent psychophysical products, can be called (...) **documents** of mental life.<sup>59</sup>

The category of impermanent "signs" includes both "symptoms" and "free movements".<sup>60</sup> The "documents" require material they are recorded on. Let us finish this discussion on the psychological method with Twardowski's postulate to combine the "subjective method" (introspection) with the "objective method":

Hence in psychological research the two methods must complement each other constantly, but we must not forget that the subjective method is the primal and fundamental method; what mental life is, what feelings, thinking, seeing and desiring are we know and may know only through introspection, that is inner experience; without it we would know nothing about mental life just like we would not know the entire world of colors without sight; without the subjective method we could not even talk about the objective method in psychology.<sup>61</sup>

This observation must be fully supported: the subjective aspect prevails in each questionnaire. Nearly each PTS temperament questionnaire statement (Strelau & Zawadzki, 1998) touches upon introspection. When we read the following sentence: "Even in an unfamiliar place I quickly start to feel >at home<" – we need to refer to our own experience to understand what "feel" means. Every behavior described can be explained with some inner phenomenon.

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<sup>57</sup> Twardowski, *O psychologii, jej przedmiocie, zadaniach, metodzie, stosunku do innych nauk i jej rozwoju*, 1965 h, p. 258

<sup>58</sup> Twardowski, *O psychologii, jej przedmiocie, zadaniach, metodzie, stosunku do innych nauk i jej rozwoju*, 1965 h, p. 258.

<sup>59</sup> See above

<sup>60</sup> See footnote No. 5.

<sup>61</sup> Twardowski, *O psychologii, jej przedmiocie, zadaniach, metodzie, stosunku do innych nauk i jej rozwoju*, 1965 h, p. 260

### *Model of subjective dynamisms*

When explaining – we create models, not only logical ones but also real ones, that is models that present things and relations between them. This direction was charted by Kreutz:

I have already introduced basic descriptive notions I was interested in. For the sake of clarity, I will once again discuss the logical relations between the two notions and real relations between their objects; it will allow me to present the **image of mental life** with the use of the notional apparatus applied.<sup>62</sup>

As a result we obtain a kind of >anatomy< of man understood as the subject, that is an acting being. We pose the following question: if (s)he acts, then what forces (dynamisms) make him/her act? Logical relations describe how (s)he acts, in what circumstances, while real relations point to existential causes of actions taken, to subjective dynamisms and activities those dynamisms manifest themselves in.

What is crucial in the process of describing mental phenomena – and based on the phenomena both qualitative methods and projection techniques – is outlining a model of phenomena mentioned in this paper. These are not limited to mental phenomena but also include **dispositions**, *i.e.* states the subject experiences (e.g. their sensitivity). Let us look closer at those phenomena and interrelations between them.

The method of reaching the subject's dynamisms is of great importance. We can name several steps in which the description of what is given (*explanandum*) is just the introduction. Then we have induction, reduction and interpretation.

### *Inductive method*

The first step towards reaching the inner man (*i.e.* moving from products to actions) is the classical **induction** understood as moving away from the multiplicity of facts and their complexity towards the integrity of their meanings. It is mental capability as the sense comprehends only facts. This is how Twardowski perceives the action and the product; he starts with the product:

What is created thanks to, as a result of some action can be called the product of the action. Hence, we can say that a jump is the result of jumping while a song is the result of singing.<sup>63</sup>

The product therefore is explained with the action. It should be stressed: not through situation stimuli (behaviorism), not through an outer situation itself (the system model).

In the sentence: “jump is the product of jumping”, jump is a material phenomenon while the action of “jumping” is not. Different kinds of a product are explained with different inner actions. When a child jumps with excitement is one thing while when someone wants to take a long jump is something different.

In induction we always start with something individual as an example: the ex-

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<sup>62</sup> Kreutz, *Podstawy psychologii. Studium nad metodami i pojęciami współczesnej psychologii*, 1949, p. 389.

<sup>63</sup> Twardowski, *O czynnościach i wytworach. Kilka uwag z pogranicza psychologii, gramatyki i logiki*, 1965 g, p. 220.

ample leads inside.<sup>64</sup> It is characteristic for the descriptive psychology that makes use of the analytical method. As Paczkowska-Łagowska writes:

The method consists in capturing specific features of a phenomenon in inner experience and including them in the analytical definition the subject of which no longer is a specific phenomenon but its type. The definition is then verified in a given field of research. The scientific nature of the procedure is based in this case on being given in the light of what the object of the research is.<sup>65</sup>

Thanks to induction, the mind does not get lost in the vast experience of different products (the multiplicity and complexity of phenomena) as it understands them as actions taken by the subject. What is the action itself?

The action itself consists in transforming, changing material; the action changes the arrangement of its particles or introduces some other changes.<sup>66</sup>

It points to the function of the action. What is it in fact? What is the real basis for its existence? Twardowski points to dispositions:

The subject of psychology are not just mental facts but also some conditions that determine their occurrence and their nature.<sup>67</sup>

Certainly, not all conditions as the notion of „condition” is broad; there are chemical and mechanical conditions (stimuli), anatomical and physiological (sense organs). We are interested only in those conditions that affect mental actions and products. These include:

Conditions that determine mental facts known as sensitivity, memory, imagination, disposition, tendency, inclination, will, character, etc. All those conditions are collectively called “dispositions”.<sup>68</sup>

Let us stop here to discuss reconstruction of those conditions performed with the use of the reducing method.

### *Reduction to the right reasons*

M. Kreutz tried to build a model consisting of subjective structures such as will. He starts with fundamental phenomena available introspectively such as experiences and mental states. Among the phenomena he names complexes and elements (observational, intellectual, emotional and volitional ones). The elements include characteristics or attributes of experiences:

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<sup>64</sup> The term induction has a broad meaning; it means “introduction”. It is not induction as defined by positivists as generalization of a number of cases of coexistence of different elements, which will apply to future similar cases.

<sup>65</sup> Paczkowska-Łagowska, 1980, p. 14.

<sup>66</sup> See above, p. 229.

<sup>67</sup> Twardowski, *O psychologii, jej przedmiocie, zadaniach, metodzie, stosunku do innych nauk i jej rozwoju*, 1965 h, p. 244.

<sup>68</sup> Twardowski, *O psychologii, jej przedmiocie, zadaniach, metodzie, stosunku do innych nauk i jej rozwoju*, 1965 h, p. 244.

Complexes and elements are no longer time-related parts but dependent features that can be identified in experience or a mental state. Therefore, the relation between complexes and elements to emotions and states is the relation between dependent features and self-contained objects. What comes to mind is defining it as a relation between attribute and substance. However, it would be incorrect as we cannot perceive mental experience as something substantial but the other way round; experiences characterize also the subject who undergoes them.<sup>69</sup>

Kreutz concludes that those characteristics are characteristics of the substantialist subject itself. Hence, the subject becomes the subject of the research, and not just experience and mental material directly accessible in introspective experience. We need to remember that for Kreutz a mental phenomenon is “a real, mental object, given directly in experience”.<sup>70</sup> A characteristic always describes someone or something. Such a view on the characteristic<sup>71</sup> as an expression of a being, i.e. what someone or something is, is a qualitative approach. This is a reductionist approach<sup>72</sup> within the meaning of reducing to the right arguments.<sup>73</sup> In our case we reduce products and actions to subjective dynamisms behind them. If the object of description is a “dynamic subject” then the next step is to define “subject’s dynamisms”. They create an image, i.e. the product of interpretation of phenomena.

### *Interpretation*

Cognitive reduction (to reasons) allows us for interpretation. The purpose of interpretation is to create an adequate intellectual image of the object – so that it matches the object observed. Adequacy means that the researcher captured all reasons that explain the object and did it correctly, maintaining the right proportion. To **understand** means to capture the meanings of things and interrelations between things. Different products mean dynamisms of different quality and their functions (actions).

When we talk about the “structure” of dynamisms, we mean some “elements” in specific interrelations with one another. We illustrate this interrelations (and structure) in the form of the so-called mosaic subject model (Jarosiewicz, 2009) (Jarosiewicz, 2010).

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<sup>69</sup> Kreutz, *Podstawy psychologii. Studium nad metodami i pojęciami współczesnej psychologii*, 1949, p. 390.


<sup>70</sup> By real object he means: “an object being part of objective reality, independent from the observing subject”. (Kreutz, *Podstawy psychologii. Studium nad metodami i pojęciami współczesnej psycholo*, 1949, p. 350).

<sup>71</sup> According to Twardowski, the notion of a characteristic has two meanings: “A characteristic (nota, *tekmerion*) of an object is all that differentiates it from other objects”, but also, after Stoeckl: “by characteristics we generally mean all those moments which allow us to get to know the object, what it is, and differentiate it from all other objects” in: (Twardowski, *O treści i przedmiocie przedstawień*, 1965 a, p. 37).

<sup>72</sup> To learn more about different natures of reductionism in psychology see: (Opoczyńska, 1997), (Paszkiwicz, 1983).

<sup>73</sup> The term “reducere” means “to reduce”: reducing to the right arguments or grounds that is: explaining, interpreting. The argument behind the existence of each single being is its nature reflected in the definition.

Figure 2: Dynamism of the human subject (the mosaic model)



In the model we assume three levels of dynamisms. As a consequence, in order to explain behavior, references to somatic reactions and the so-called reaction pre-conditioning is not enough; we need to take into account other dynamisms, in particular specific want-related activities which produce targeted actions (Koziellecki, 1987). Referring to the concept of actions and products we should say that the notion of „will” means both the product (e.g. the last will of a dead person) as well as action (someone does not want to consent to given objectives) and disposition to take given actions and achieving products (someone has weak will). Within the last meaning, will appears as a peculiar dynamism.

In the model we also illustrate two complementary aspects of human dynamism, *i.e.* two types of actions that cannot be reduced to each other. “Psyche” is objectivizing cognition (and everything based thereon, including consciousness processes such as thinking). The product of those activities is “manifestations”. The aspect we are particularly interested in is the ability to experience<sup>74</sup> values thanks to “nature” and its condition, characterized by given sensitivity. Sensitivity is a (permanent) product of individual’s experience. Therefore “behavior” is not just a manifestation of mental material, but also spontaneous judgment of a situation. Thanks to sensual sensitivity man experiences values of actions taken by elements of a situation and not just their material influence (as stimuli triggering “reactions”). Let us add that talking about

<sup>74</sup> The term “experience” was put aside in discussions about man due to popularization of one-side activist concepts while it covers a wide range of phenomena. Describing functions of the soul, Rene Descartes writes that “these are mainly of two types: one is actions of the soul, while the other its experiences.” (Descartes, 1986, p. 77). “Experiencing” is an activity that consists in accepting something as a result of something’s (someone else’s) actions, something or someone that has potential, that is the source of movement or change. Experiencing is the product of impacting the subject, its specific dynamism.

experiencing we should use the term “activation” (of dynamism) rather than “action” (mental).

Applying this model we need to modify – otherwise correct – use of the term “psychosomatic reactions”. Certainly, somatic reactivity is dynamism; however, not the only one. Therefore, we should talk about psychodynamic reactions among which we can name psychosomatic reactions. Other reactions include psychoemotive reactions, such as emotion or excitement, or psychovolitional reactions, such as targeted aspirations. Due to lack of space available we cannot develop the thought in this paper.

## Catalogue of objective actions

### *The notion of object*

After Kreutz, we distinguished two types of physical phenomena: free movements and symptoms (of mental phenomena). We would also like to know basic types of mental phenomena, *i.e.* objective actions.

Using the term “objective action” we would like to point to the fact that there is nothing like objectless action. However, the “object” category is very broad; the word “object” (*obiectum*) covers “people and things, phenomena, states, events, their properties and interrelations, in a word, everything we can imagine or think.”<sup>75</sup> Not only the object of cognition, but also the object of difficult acting. It may be acting on external material: labor and acting on inner material: white-collar work.<sup>76</sup> According to the concept of actions and products formulated by K. Twardowski (Twardowski, 1965 g) each action is an objective phenomenon within the meaning given by phenomenologists<sup>77</sup> *i. e.* is an intentional action.<sup>78</sup> Hence, each action has an object it gets to know or changes.

### *Actions and acting on*

Apart from objects acted on (and changed as a result), there are objects experienced; the objects change the subject. Man’s activity in the world is relatively complex: the subject gets to know and changes the world, but the world also acts on the subject, this way prompting his/her activation. A product of activation that we can experience is sensations and experiences. We tend to capture them in the sentence:

<sup>75</sup> Twardowski, *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia*, 1965 c, p. 114.


<sup>76</sup> As Kreutz stresses: In the philosophical meaning, the term expresses the most general, highest notion that exists, a notion that has no features but has the broadest range. The object in this context is everything without any limitations. Colloquially, we use in this sense the pronoun something (Kreutz, *Podstawy psychologii. Studium nad metodami i pojęciami współczesnej psychologii*, 1949, p. 350).

<sup>77</sup> Compare: (Brentano, 1999).

<sup>78</sup> „The trait common to all mental phenomena consists in what was often referred to as (...) **consciousness**, that is a kind of subjective behavior, a kind of – as defined – *intentional* reference to something which although might not be real, however given internally to the subject. There is no listening without the thing listened to, no believing without what is believed in, no expecting without what is expected, no aiming without the aims. (...)” (Brentano, *O Źródle poznania moralnego*, 1989, pp. 17-18).

“something is going on inside of me”. This is an aspect of passiveness, apart from the activity of the subject which is universally stressed.

Figure 3: Acting and experiencing acting



Man as a being undergoes changes as a result of acting upon him/her, but – simultaneously – experiences values of that acting. The experience allows man to know whether it is a favorable or unfavorable influence. We tend to say in such a situation that man experiences “problems”:

Situation – as Lewicki wrote – constitutes a self-regulating problem for man all the time: that is, how to get what is positive and avoid what is negative, harmful, unpleasant.<sup>79</sup>

The aspect of passiveness of man in the world was discussed by K. Twardowski who distinguished a number of mental actions, and among them „experiencing sensations”, not getting to know sensations! He wrote:

We ascribe mental life to beings that experience sensations, reconstruct them from memory, wonder, think, compare, differentiate, ponder, doubt, pay attention, think abstractly, hesitate, feel pleasure and distress, worry and feel happy, fear and expect, want, flinch, desire, choose, decide.

### *Catalogue of actions*

Let us try to systematize acts of activation and subjective actions. It will allow us to define what actions we deal with in qualitative methods and in the so-called projective tests.

In the case of all actions we start with “experiencing sensations”. In this „wholeness” we distinguish „experience” and „cognition”:

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<sup>79</sup> Lewicki, *Procesy poznawcze i orientacja w otoczeniu*, 1960, p. 35.

**The act of experiencing:**

The object of experiencing is a value while the product is activation of a sensual sphere (experiencing as emotion (*emotio* in Latin)).

**The act of sensual cognition:**

The object is a sensual form (of a thing) while the product is a mental object that is some kind of content (“the object”). It is knowledge: about things and us from the outside (as things among other things).

Let us compare: Cognition is an act of sensual cognition that occurs parallel with another act: experiencing. As Stachowski writes: Twardowski defines the relation between “a mental act and content” as a relationship between an act and a product.<sup>80</sup> We assume here that experience is also a mental act, but it does not cover the content (“what” acts) but a value and the product of that act (of activation) is emotion.

**The act of undergoing:**

The object is emotion (or excitement) while the product is pleasure/distress. Undergoing no emotions and, indirectly, of values, is desire.

**The act of feeling:**

The object is an emotion (desire), while the product is a peculiar mental object (“vague”).

**The act of reflecting (internalizing):**

The object is a mental object (an „object”) or the value felt while the product is impression.

**The act of reflecting:**

The object is content produced by consciousness (internal) while the product is **self-knowledge and knowledge** in the form of images (memorized).

The act of projecting:

The object is impressions while the product is values understood as optimal states<sup>81</sup> (content and relations) given as images.

**The act of decision-making** *i.e.* subjectivization (interiorization):

The object is a motive (the content of consciousness) while the product is the aim or a way of achieving it.

**The act of deciding:**

The object is the aim: a situation, expressed in an impression (image) or concept while the product is dynamizing one’s will (intention).

**The act of acting:**

The object is a material object or other persons being the object of actions (their will). The product is our or someone else’s behavior.<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> Stachowski, *Historia współczesnej myśli psychologicznej. Od Wundta do czasów najnowszych*, 2004, p. 86 and subsequent: discusses the meaning of the concept of actions and products in Twardowski’s works.

<sup>81</sup> The notion of value defined by Kulczycki: “The value is an optimum state of relationships in a given life situation (Kulczycki, *Działalność człowieka - aspekty podmiotowe i przedmiotowe*, 1985, p. 8); man not only experiences values but also projects them.

<sup>82</sup> It applies to management; T. Listwan understands them as a “mechanism of interactions: causative subject – the object of acting” (Listwan, 1995, p. 11).

Certainly, the catalogue is not a closed one as we can categorize the above actions in terms of different objectives. Some of the above actions are extremely complex. The act of reflecting is both **conceptualizing**, that is creating “symbolic representations” (Twardowski, 1965 c), which can also be called “distinguishing”, as well as making **judgments and reasoning**, which tends to be called **thinking**. We have not listed the act of thinking as such.

We did distinguish, however, the act of projecting as a separate category. The object of projecting is impressions and images processed in such a way that they gain value. Values sometimes come to mind as spontaneous images and also in the so-called fantasizing. It is rich material for creating (Jarosiewicz, 2009).

## Qualitative methods

### *Qualitative methods in modern psychology*

The issue of qualitative methods is vividly discussed in modern psychology (Straś-Romanowska, 2000) (Paluchowski W. J., 2006). One of issues frequently brought up is the quality of life (Kulczycki, 1990; Derbis, 2000). A new methodology of qualitative research (Zeidler, 2008) and new statistical methods relevant for the issues of qualitative research are being developed (Kowal, 2000).

As pointed out by Straś-Romanowska, qualitative methods are used not only to learn more about personality but to learn more about man’s development throughout his/her entire life and in psychohistory dealing with “tracking man’s life, individual lot, lifestyles in both the external perspective based on biographical materials (including works created) as well as the internal perspective through analyses of autobiographies”.<sup>83</sup> In this paper we attempt to define their place in psychological diagnosis (the professional one in particular).

### *Understanding of “quality”*

Several definitions of the notion of “qualitative methods” come to mind. The category of quality tends to appear accompanied by another category, *i.e.*: quantity.<sup>84</sup> In this part we would like to discuss both the method of examining quality and the method of diagnosing it (*i.e.* recognition). First of all: how should we understand “quality”?

It seems it is about the meaning of phenomena observed and measured. The concept of actions and products offers a precise understanding of the term “meaning”. The meaning of psychophysical products is determined by mental products:

A psychophysical product is a sign of a mental product while a mental product is a sign of a psychophysical product.<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> Straś-Romanowska, 2000, p. 28). See also (Straś-Romanowska, *Poradnictwo wobec problemów egzystencjalnych człowieka*, 1996.

<sup>84</sup> Stachowski, *O niektórych problemach metodologicznych pomiaru w psychologii*, 2008.

<sup>85</sup> Twardowski, *O czynnościach i wytworach. Kilka uwag z pogranicza psychologii, gramatyki i logiki*, 1965 g, p. 233.

As the psychophysical product (to be more precise: psychodynamic) is a material phenomenon, it is subject to observation and measurement. On the other hand, a mental product is accessible not in observation but in inner perception (Twardowski, 1965 f). There is no measurement available and, consequently, no quantity.

To put it colloquially, quality is not quantity (just like a person is not a thing). If we say something weighs 5 kg, we determine quantity: 5 is not precise, we can just as well say that something is 5 cm long. The quality is “inertia” and “expansion” (attributes of material bodies). Similarly we can say that a man works as he has carried something for 10 meters and a machine works as it has carried something for 10 meters, and we can use for this purpose a well-known formula for calculating work:

$$W = F * s \text{ (where } F = \text{force, and } s = \text{way)}$$

These are however different qualities as man wants to do something, plans, feels exhausted, etc. The qualities are available only when the person working tells us about it or when we ourselves feel it inside.

We come across different qualities when we deal with differences concerning the essence of an action or a mental product. Therefore, we differentiate, for example, between jealousy and greed, rage and revenge, etc. It allows us to formulate definitions: rage is an action that arises when someone is disrespected. How strong is the rage or jealousy we can assume based on psychophysical products, that is actions taken under its influence or abandonment (for example, if jealousy paralyses actions while rage manifests itself in the form of revenge).

But there is also another definition of “quality”; it concerns the state of subjective dynamisms. We can access them also empirically – by experiencing them. Experiencing dynamisms is very characteristic, we say: “Something is going on inside of me” and not: “I am acting”. Defining “what” a task or “problem” the person needs to deal with is.

### *Feeling as a way of accessing qualitative phenomena*

The fact that someone opens to experienced ideas, that experiences them, is the act of opening to certain qualities. We cannot talk here about quantities; we say “that” something is going on but not “in what quantity”. **Experiences** are spontaneous, direct subjectivization of a subject while those different states (dispositions) are qualities. The experiences reach consciousness provided that they are felt.

Reflecting feelings is a totally different issue than measurement of features of material behavior. The thing is how to present the qualities experienced, for example sadness? A commonly used method is verbalization.<sup>86</sup> But even if we say it is a “deep grief” (inconsolable, etc.), it will not be a quantitative measure. It is a “deep” grief for a given person; for someone else it will be of no importance. While the term “extensive knowledge” means the same for a lot of people.

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<sup>86</sup> Writers are better than psychologists at dealing with this task, see for example a well-known book by C. Lewis entitled “A Grief Observed” (Lewis, 2009).

### *Some manifestations of qualitative phenomena*

One may ask if intelligence understood as disposition is not a quantitative phenomenon as it can be measured?

Quantity is always a quantity of something and that „something” gives meaning to the quantity. Intelligence is not a test result (it does not grow with subsequent tests), is not just a measure used to compare people in an assignment but is a measure of rationality as subjective dynamism. The way of obtaining the quantitative dimension of the dynamism of reason is situation-dependent but the result obtained becomes meaningful once we relate it to the subject. The intelligence quotient is then the quantitative measure of clarity of internal perception and understanding, is an individual measure of rationality as person’s essential characteristic.

At the beginning of this paragraph we mentioned that qualities (the essence) can be examined and identified. Recognizing quality in other people is based on diversification of dispositions and mental phenomena (mental actions and products) based on their material products (expressions). For example, we distinguish man’s behavior from man’s conduct. The term “behavior” reflects the look of the subject being the expression of bodily reactivity and typical emotionality (temperament). “Conduct”, on the other hand, reflects will of a person intending to achieve a specific goal.

One of the most mysterious actions is choice, *i.e.* deciding about the object of wanting. **Decisions** “clearly contribute to subjective ordering of people’s lives.”<sup>87</sup> Man becomes not only a designer (creator) but also the doer. The decision is accompanied by existential relocation of the subject’s center of gravity. The product of cognition is an object existing in the subject. The product of subjectivization that is taking some ideas for one’s own is a subject existing in an (intentional) object. A person feels self-fulfilled (or not) accomplishing his/her goals.

In the diagnosis of occupational tendencies with the use of a film test the subject of the research is occupational tendencies (Achtlich, 1979). Pascal claimed that „heart has its own arguments that reason lacks”. The problem is to reach those arguments, even to measure them. They become known in the situation of making choices. Man governs himself/herself, *i.e.* acts under the influence of his/her will, but each time (s)he must define the motive, *i.e.* the direction of his/her actions. It requires defining the “object of wanting” as we always want “something”. If there are no other reasons, such as knowledge or competency, then tendencies become the “reasons” behind a choice.

## Analysis of personal problems by M. Kulczycki

### *Experiencing gives rise to problems*

The occurrence of personal problems is connected with the fundamental duality of man’s existence in the world. Twardowski already observed that phenomenon writing that man “experiences sensations”. We can point to the following two consequences of this fact:

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<sup>87</sup> Kulczycki, *Psychologiczne warunki radzenia sobie w życiu*, 1990, p. 21.

If someone excessively experiences something then the experiences prevent clear cognition of the sensations and taking actions. This is the essence of stress. On the other hand, if man gets to know the content of sensations and acts consciously, then (s)he cuts himself/herself off experiencing values of a situation and loses certainty whether any actions are worth-taking. Without experiencing our situation in the world we cannot define the quality of our lives (Derbis, 2000) (Derbis, 2008). A number of researched “have touched” this personal dimension of their lives but Kulczycki made it the subject of his research. He wrote:

It seems justified to **assume** that behind experiences and behavior of our patients there are certain personal problems that cannot be solved on one’s own, despite bigger or smaller efforts taken.

I would like to point to two important moments in this quotation. First of all: he distinguishes a phenomenon defined as a “personal problem”. It is characteristic for descriptive psychology: it gives an example and puts forward a general statement. Kulczycki starts with patients’ (clients’) complaints:

Patients’ (clients’) complaints are connected with different failures they experienced while attempting to accomplish important personal goals. Some patients are sorry for harm they did, which cannot be repaired, like causing a permanent disability. Some other mention wasting life opportunity, like promotion, due to negligence of important issues.<sup>88</sup>

Based on his vast experience he performs induction, that is transition to notional unity: he states that: either action lowers the quality of life or negligence results in an unpleasant feeling of lacking something. He defined it as a “personal problem”. It is a fundamental truth about man’s life as in his opinion

The object of our interest is man’s life in all its psychological aspects. It is defined as an **organized activity developing** in the world that is constantly changing, oriented towards dealing with everyday personal problems in order to attain high quality of life.<sup>89</sup>

According to Paczkowska-Łagowska, such a statement that activity is orientated towards dealing with problems, “is not inductive generalization but the result of capturing through intuition what is characteristic for an act being examined.”<sup>90</sup> As we have already mentioned, induction within its classical meaning, understood as capturing the meaning, differs from the generalizing induction. The classical form of intuition Paczkowska presents as an „act of intuition”, which emphasizes participation of senses. *Intueor* - means: I watch, I see; intuitive cognition is nothing but examining cognition. Paczkowska adds:

The description obtained through **intuition** becomes **a definition of a phenomenon examined in terms of its typicality**. Transition from specificity to typicality is of great

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<sup>88</sup> See above, p. 12.

<sup>89</sup> Kulczycki, *Zarys relacyjnej koncepcji poradnictwa*, 1985, str. 142). Words made in bold by the author.

<sup>90</sup> Paczkowska-Łagowska, 1980, p. 53), underlined by the author.

importance: through this transition we no longer describe a mental phenomenon *hic et nunc* and **construe an abstract object** that corresponds to the nature of the phenomenon; this way we move away from the empirical matter-of-factness of experiences.<sup>91</sup>

The activity examined by Kulczycki has then two dimensions: subjective, *i.e.* experiences and objective, *i.e.* behavior. Stating that „there are some problems hidden behind experiences and behavior” points to the method of explanation: he points to inner conditions. Kulczycki assumes the position of a life observer. Man and his/her life are here “*explanandum*”, which means that relevant conditions explaining behavior must belong to the world of the subject (Ajdukiewicz, 1965).

### *Dealing with problems*

Another important aspect: What does “dealing with problems” depend on? Each activity of living systems depends on their relations with the environment, while personal activity is specific as a person knows their relations and decides about them. However – the orientation may differ as it is based on processes of reflection of different quality; it is abstract, vivid and intuitive (Kulczycki, 1990).

The knowledge about the way man regulates his/her relations with his/her professional environment “determines” the entire concept of counseling understood relatively.<sup>92</sup> As Kulczycki writes:

The relations consist of requirements set by each party, their fulfillment and situations in which the relations occur. Relations result in certain values able to organize certain actions taken by man. A value is a certain optimal state of relations in a given life situation.<sup>93</sup>

The relation, that is referring the situation to one’s own life, is experience which is hardly ever clear. Therefore, we read on:

Values as well as other components of activity may appear as objective systems that indeed determine man’s well-being and as a subjective projection presenting the existing reality more or less precisely.

The task of a specialist, career counselor, is cooperation with a client in order to objectivize and optimize those relations. A. Kargulowa assumes that “by **counselling** we most often define social activities whose main objective is optimization of other activities.”<sup>94</sup> The moment of taking a mature decision is of key importance:

The values’ ability to organize activities mentioned is only a potential feature and not all values create actual behavior. It happens only when thanks to **decision-making processes** the value transforms in a given situation into a **purpose**.

The purpose sets the direction for the activity and impacts its structure so that it takes into account features of a given life situation.<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>91</sup> Paczkowska-Łągowska, 1980), see above, words made in bold by the author.

<sup>92</sup> In 1985 Kulczycki published a paper entitled *Zarys relacyjnej koncepcji poradnictwa* (Kulczycki, 1985).

<sup>93</sup> Kulczycki, *Działalność człowieka - aspekty podmiotowe i przedmiotowe*, 1985, p. 8.

<sup>94</sup> Kargulowa, *Poradnictwo jako podstawowa kategoria poradownictwa*, 1980, p. 328.

<sup>95</sup> Kulczycki, *Działalność człowieka - aspekty podmiotowe i przedmiotowe*, 1985, p. 8.

Undoubtedly, these are all inner phenomena, actions which explain this product – behavior. Kulczycki has a great orientation in the inner world, that is in the world of experiences.

The concept of problem-solving is a result of reduction, i. e. reducing observations of the rich world of products to the central notion of “problem-solving”. The axis of these efforts taken by the subject is aspiration to attain a higher quality of life (Tomaszewski, 1984). The quality of life is ... experience.

## Systematization of techniques of qualitative diagnosis

### *Reflection and projection*

The subject of diagnosis is the rich world of inner phenomena. They are given in inner experience, that is are accessible introspectively, and in outer experience: as a meaning of products that come into being.

Phenomena being the object of cognition may also become the object of diagnosis, *i.e.* their recognition.<sup>96</sup> Diagnosis consists in recognizing actions based on products being the manifestation of the actions, which means that the phenomena are known already. Therefore, our final aim is to produce a catalogue of qualitative methods, *i.e.* methods whose subject is actions and products as well as dispositions to actions and products.

First of all, we need to point out that the tools used to diagnose mental phenomena are not only projective tests (Sęk, 1984) (Stasiakiewicz, 2000) as projection is just one of identified phenomena. The notion of projection, Latin *proiectio* = throwing, is explained as: “Projection onto a screen (...) one of personality’s defense mechanisms consisting in projecting one’s feelings and desires onto the outer world and attributing one’s own motives, thoughts, attitudes, etc. to other people.”<sup>97</sup> On the other hand, the Latin term *proiectus* means “moving to the front”; it may be intentional action; an idea, plan or scheme of an undertaking. This is how plans of action are created.

We deal here with two types of actions: reflection and projection. The differences between them are considerable; however, in this paper we will point only to differences in motivation. Motivation may be experiential: I want (something...), or cognitive: that is what I want.

In the case of projecting, personal desires (I want) are experienced and manifest themselves in ideas (e.g. projecting an action, planning the action) or even fantasizing. In that case desire as an act of will influences the inner product and makes it meaningful (apart from the cognitive content). We could call this phenomenon “wanting thinking”; it is thinking pervaded by wanting (desire) and setting a direction to it through the motives projected. This is an introvert orientation in which un-

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<sup>96</sup> Paluchowski assumes that diagnosis is “**recognizing** individual conditions of things based on their signs and development tendencies, referring to general regularities.” (Paluchowski W. J., 2006).

<sup>97</sup> Tokarski, 1980.

clear phenomena – desires – become clear. In this way man learns more about himself/herself! It is not a distortion of cognition as cognition (internalization of ideas as motives of actions) is always ancillary towards man's self-fulfillment. An invitation to such cognition is Socratic "know thyself" (Plato, 1993).

On the other hand, in the process of reflection there is a risk that the image of oneself and the world may be distorted as there is no experiencing of desires; it is "thinking wanting". It means that aspirations arise in "I" itself, the mind does not read its well-being (in desires), but creates it. This is how individual desires, which may significantly differ from personal desires, arise. And as personal desires do exist, then, as they cannot be felt due to extravert orientation, they are projected to the outer world.

We can try to explain a mechanism that helps the lost desires find their place in the outer world in the following way: at the deepest level man "experiences sensations" (Twardowski, 1965 h). Normally, we feel that a hot room is not pleasant for us, we project change of the situation through behavior. It is referring something to us, that is experiencing – relatively understood! - value (a situation in relation to us). At the moment of cutting oneself off experiencing emotions and desires, experiencing is not "filtered off" the sensation (that is: there are no pure sensations, devoid of the element of experiencing, as these are sensations<sup>98</sup>). The value becomes a feature of the situation observed and not relation, that is referring something to oneself. Then it is the result of some deficiency in experiencing.

From a certain point of view, projection is something totally natural as, since experiencing is connected with the world influencing an object, – certainly – the ability to take such actions should be attributed to the world, not us.

Projection techniques are ways of examining projection understood as perceiving values in a material of sensual cognition, *i.e.* sensations. The procedure of the research itself requires so as the test material is not experienced (and felt) but acquainted with (e.g. on a piece of paper).<sup>99</sup> However, with time, apart from projection, other techniques of examining inner phenomena have been developed.

### *Identification*

If man experiences values, self is exhilarated, we can say that man exists because he ... **desires**. In the case we deal with projection, man participates in the world which acts and of which man is a part, while, when desire appears, man becomes the source of action, becomes the subject. Desire is experiencing lack of something, and when experience or desire (lack of pleasant experience) appears, personal life and not just natural life starts: will is motivated to take actions.<sup>100</sup> In desire a person experiences

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<sup>98</sup> We can imagine such sensations on ... a piece of paper. It seems that in formal sciences we encounter distancing from the moment of experiencing.

<sup>99</sup> An exception is, for example, Lescher's test of colors as color influences the senses.

<sup>100</sup> Action is stimulated by need (the level of nature) or motivation (the level of a person): "The integrity of overall behavior arises usually from a need or personalized motivation being its base, which gives rise to behavior and directs it" (Nuttin, *Struktura osobowości*, 1968, p. 28).

himself/herself, his/her power. This phenomenon is called **inflation**. Inflation (Latin *inflatio*) = means “inflation, flatulence”.<sup>101</sup> However, the person desiring something is able to take action immediately. Therefore, experiencing desires stimulated identification with someone who already acts in the way the person desires. In the Achtnich’s test (Achtnich, 1979) there is a reference to **identification**; the author writes:

Test photos present professionals at work. The person who is to choose from among the photos identifies for a moment with the professional presented and faces a question: “Could I, like the employee, do this job with those tools and materials, in that work environment?” Identification with the employee stimulates the subject’s structure of tendencies. Based on their feelings, the subject makes a spontaneous choice.<sup>102</sup>

Identification takes place at the moment of making a choice.<sup>103</sup> We assume that both the Achtnich’s photo test as well as the film test is a **multiple-choice test**. By choosing we decide what we want. The decision can be affected by a number of conditions. Usually we refer to the image of oneself and the world. However, it may be affected by projection or identification.

Apart from multiple-choice tests we can name **projective tests** (creation test), e.g. a drawing of a family. They help us define desires that affect object’s images of themselves, and, indirectly, of values important for a given person.

What is common to all those methods is reaching to the person’s world of needs as given in experience. Only in experience can the person (consciousness) have direct contact with needs.<sup>104</sup>

### *Personal phenomena and individual phenomena*

Among qualitative methods we can distinguish two main groups (categories). If we came to the conclusion that qualities are meanings of products, we need to add that the meanings have their specific nature.

There are techniques in which we distinguish experiences and desires: e.g. color tests. We can call the phenomena in general personal. There are also phenomena chosen by the “mind” and not the “heart”. Such choices are influenced by individual ideas, that is the image of oneself and the world.

At this point, certainly, new questions arise: To what extent do personal ideas (experiences) influence individual phenomena? It would be necessary to lead the personal dimension to self-knowledge, *i.e.* make it meaningful in the image of oneself and the world.

Asking a person directly: “What do you like” does not specify whether we mean

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<sup>101</sup> The term *inflatus* means pompous, swollen, proud, angry, outraged” (Dictionary of Latin, 260). Szondi points out that “the function after Jung is called inflation (Szondi L. , 1995, p. 100).

<sup>102</sup> Achtnich, *Der Berufsbilder-Test. Projektives Verfahren zur Abklärung der Berufsneigung*, 1979, p. r. 1.

<sup>103</sup> Projection may affect the choice in terms of content as we choose what we see.


<sup>104</sup> If, for example, parental needs mature, then experiences arise and the phenomena of identification related with them (in particular at the age of 11-14).

one's sensitivity (personal meaning) or the image of oneself (individual meaning)? Spontaneous choice allows for both possibilities. Such a procedure is applied in the Achtnich's test. The procedure allows us to specify what motives a subject in the research has. We analyze also associations with selected images. Then we can answer the question: was the choice (decision) determined by experience (desire) or reference to oneself (the image of oneself)?

Should we, in such a case, make the instruction more precise? There is, however, an obstacle to do so. We do not know in advance the quality of our client's orientation. If the orientation is intuitive, then the person rather "experiences" values of the situation that gets to know it. If the orientation is pictorial, then we deal with habitual decisions. By habit we mean the character of the subject of the research (Jarosiewicz, 2001). Seldom will it be abstract reference to a situation as the test is pictorial. Therefore, we can assume that what we examine is **the professional character** understood as a structure of tendencies of a given person that manifests itself first in experiences and desires and then in the picture of oneself and the world, in its pictorial layer.<sup>105</sup>

Below we present a preliminary attempt to organize qualitative methods.

Figure 4: Division of qualitative methods



The basic tool used to examine qualitative content is conversation. As Kreutz points out, in conversation “when man speaks, usually (...) (s)he thinks and talks simultaneously. Free speech is thinking aloud. (...) speech can be listened

<sup>105</sup> It is interesting that “the image of oneself and the world” stresses also the pictorial element and not the abstract one, although, undoubtedly, it can also be an image made up of notions and judgments about oneself. However, such an image is not enough to take actions. We act in a specific way, *i.e.* in a situation.

to simultaneously by a number of people; these are psychophysical processes as objective as physical processes.”<sup>106</sup> He developed a method of questioning introspection in which methodological reflection is reached, led by researcher’s questions.

It refers to classical and most recent attempts at systematizing projective techniques (Lindzey, 1989; Straś-Romanowska, 1997; Cierpka, 2000). It is not a comprehensive classification as there are a great number of techniques used to examine the inner life.

## Conclusion

As H. Sęk writes “In the projective approach we try to obtain information about the “individual world” of the subject, expressed spontaneously”.<sup>107</sup> In this paper we have tried to demonstrate that projection is not the only way to that world.

We assumed a typology, starting from basic intuition that man rather “experiences sensations” than gets to know the world. Therefore, we have persons who experience values and feel their experiences and desires; this is an introvert orientation. There are also persons who get to know in order to act, so they are extravert. As a consequence, we can say that projection is a way of examining extraverts who see their desires “outside”. On the other hand, introverts are in much better relations with their inner actions and their products, which does not mean, however, that they can name that world; it is certain, but not clear. Persons moved by their desires project themselves into the world or identify themselves with someone else who can be the expression of their “I”.

The empirical approach in psychology is based on the statement that each action is objective (Brentano F., 1999). In order to understand inner phenomena we need to differentiate between cognition and acting. In acting, the subject changes itself and its world. The demarcation point between cognition and acting is the act of choosing as it is transition from something that is to something that may or even should be.

That is why we devoted so much space and time to the choice-related phenomena. If we assume that choice is spontaneous (sometimes habitual) determination of the object of wanting, then in those choices the person discovers himself/herself, the way they want themselves to be. Therefore, the Achtnich’s test mentioned in this paper is called the “mirror method”. A mirror does not create but reflects and lets us see ourselves. Not only does it let us project, *i.e.* create ourselves, identify with someone, but simply see ourselves in our choice. The truth of acting lies in the subject itself.

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<sup>106</sup> Kreutz, *Metody współczesnej psychologii*, 1962, p. 27.

<sup>107</sup> Sęk, 1984, p. 7.

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